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INTRODUCTION  AND  SUMMARY 
The  actual  structure of  the  Community  insurance  market 
after  1992  will  be  the  result  of  a  number  of  factors, 
namely,  the  regulatory  environment  and  changes,  both 
autonomous  and  Community-driven,  the  initial situation 
and  characteristics  of  each  Member  State  insurance 
market,  and  the  actual  strategies  of  individual 
players. 
This  paper  attempts  to  focus  on  the  two  latter issues, 
and  review  the  key  features  and  underlying  factors  of 
the  industry's  recent  and  expected  changes,  and  of the 
strategies  of  insurance  companies  to  position 
themselves  for the Single Market. 
A  widespread  belief  exists  amongst  practitioners(!) 
that  completion  of  the  Internal  Market  1n  1nsurance 
will  offer them  more  opportunities than  threats  in the 
long  run,  although most  changes will  be gradual. 
A  genuine  single  market  is  already  emerging  for  major 
corporate products,  while  for retail, practitioners and 
analysts  judqe  that  the  European  retail  insurance 
markets  will  remain  fragmented  because  of  structural 
and  cultural  factors  and  that  only  a  minority  of 
insurance  companies  is  expected  to  engage  in  cross-
border  activities,  the  rest  remaining  active 
exclusively in their own  country  (1). 
One  of  these  factors  will  be  the  pattern  of  insurance 
demand.  While  the largest corporate customers will tend 
to rely less on conventional  insurance,  medium-to-large 
firms  will  push  insurers  to  develop  international 
networks to accompany their expansion  in the industrial 
Single  Market,  and  domestically-oriented  SMEs  will 
become  more  sophisticated,  but  local  customers. 
Regarding  individuals,  heterogeneous  demand  patterns, 
proximity  preference,  and  consumer  loyalty  are  all 
elements  that  will  reduce  the  potential  attractiveness 
of insurers'  cross-border moves. 
(1)  These  are the conclusions of  a  survey of British 
financial  services companies  on  the Single Financial 
Market,  conducted by the  Bank of England  [1989],  and  a 
survey of European  insurers conducted commissioned  by 
the Geneva  Association and the Univ.  of Cologne 
Institute for Insurance Economics  (hereafter referred 
to as the Geneva-Cologne  survey). 4 
If demand  w'lil  .. riot·  .. play ·a  major· role in integration and 
if there are not significant supply-side advantages  for 
companies  to  develop  large  networks,  the  profit 
potential  in  certain  markets  may  lead  to  selective 
cross-border  investment.  Therefore  the  expected 
geographical  pattern  of  cross-border  flows  hints  at 
geographical  closeness,  market  size,  and  expected 
growth as major factors explaining cross-border moves. 
Germany,  the  UK  and  France  are  the  largest  European 
markets.  Competition is greatest in the British and the 
Dutch  markets.  German  firms  are  the  most  profitable 
ones.  Hence  companies  in these markets will expect most 
from  cross-border  from  expansion.  on  the  other  side, 
the  Mediterranean  countries  are  those  offering  higher 
growth perspectives  and therefore in principle the most 
attractive  targets.  The  profitability ·of  the  German 
market  and  the  level  of  development  of  the  Briti:sh 
industry make  them appealing,  too. 
The  chances  of  successfully  entering  one  of  these 
attractive  markets  will  depend  crucially  on  their 
penetrability,  determined  by  its structure,  the  degree 
of  regulation,  and  the  distribution  systems.  Although 
seemingly  not  very  concentrated,  corporate  law 
provisions,  a  distribution system based.on tied agents, 
make  the  German  market  difficult  to  penetrate,  while 
the  British,  French,  and  Spanish  ones  offer  higher 
opportunities for successful entry. 
As  the  Geneva-Cologne  survey  points  out,  increasing 
size is a  motivation for  firms to go  abroad.  It is also 
the  force  behind  much  of  the  consolidation  proce:ss 
taking  place  in  most  European  insurance  markets.  The 
analysis  of  the  issue  of  economies  of  scale  in  the 
insurance  industry concludes that although the  issue  :is 
still controversial,  there are  grounds_ to believe that 
spreading  fixed  costs,  better  investment  and 
reinsurance  advantages,  improved  information  and 
segmentation  possibilities,  and  brand  advantages  may 
lead  to  significant  cost  savings  for  all  but  the 
largest European  insurance companies. 5 
The  process  of  insurance  integration  is  combined  with 
that  of  the blurring  of the  frontiers  between  banking, 
insurance,  and  other  financial  services  that  responds 
to  the  economies  of  scope  and  op~ns  up  new 
possibilities  for  trans-national  expans1on.  It  also 
provides  an  alternative  strategy  for  companies 
unwilling  or unable  to  go  European.  The  examination  of 
these  phenomena  and  the  changing  patterns  of 
distribution,  concludes  that interpenetration is likely 
to continue  and  may  be  a  source of  product  innovation. 
And  that  banks,  commercial  outlets  and  financial 
intermediaries  will  continue  to  gain  market  share,  as 
distribution  becomes  more  client-oriented  and 
selective. 
Finally,  the  analysis  of  the  strategies  observed  and 
expected  from  European  insurers  leads  to  confirm  the 
view  of  many  of  the  surveyed  companies  that  1992  will 
not  trigger  major  strategy  adjustments,  but  will  just 
accelerate  the  moves  already  under  way.  Nonetheless, 
the psychological  impact of the  1992  process is  giving 
integration  a  great  impetus.  It concludes  as  well  that 
there  is  no  single  strategy  for  the  Single  Market,  as 
the variety of  actual  choices  by  insurers  confirm,  and 
that  whether  a  strategy  is  good  or  bad  will  depend  on 
the characteristics of the company  and the market. 
1.  THE  COMMUNITY  INSURANCE  INDUSTRY 
1.1)  Demand  patterns and  product mix 
The  insurance  business  offers  protection  against  some 
future,  uncertain,  event,  in  exchange  for  the  payment 
of  a  sure  premium.  Ideally,  the  insurer  can  do  so  by 
having  a  perfect  knowledge  of  the  probability 
distribution  of  the  event's  occurrence,  and  by 
balancing  risks  over  a  large  population,  which  allows 
him  to  apply  the  law  of  large  numbers  in  setting 
premiums. 
The  areas  of application are  many  and  diverse,  and  are 
usually  grouped  into  three  main  branches:  life,  non-
life,  and  reinsurance.  This distinction is also adopted 
by the  Community  Directives. 
Life  assurance  has  as  objectives  income  protection  and 
endowment.  Therefore  demand  for life products is likely 
to  be  influenced  by  demographic  factors  (population 
size,  and  age  distribution)  as  illustrated  in  DIAGRAM 
1. 
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Other  determinants  are  personal  income  and  wealth,  the 
extent  and  prospects  of  public  pay-as-you-go  social 
security  systems,  and  the  competitive  edge  of  the 
insurance  industry  in  attracting  personal  savings 
(partly influenced by tax systems) (2). 
DIAGRAMS  2  and  3  show that these variables take oh very 
different values  in the various Member States' markets. 
The  demand  for  non-life  insurance  is  likely  to  be 
affected  by  the  car  population  and  cjrowth,  the  house 
stock,  investment,  output  and  foreign  trade  levels,  as 
well  as  the  legal,  judicial,  and  regulatory  systems 
(e.g.  compulsory  motor  insurance,  or  judicial 
responsiveness  to  consumer  accide.nt  claims)  and,  last 
but not least,  by cultural attitudes towards risks. 
The  variety  of  these  determinants  across  countries  is 
reflected  in the  breakdown  by  broad  insurance  lines of 
the  non-life  insurance  activity  in  th~ various  Member 
States,  presented in DIAGRAM  4. 
1.2.  Relative development  and market shares 
The  Community's  market  share  in  the  world  direct 
insurance  in  terms  of  total  premiums  written  in  the 
domestic  market  was  23%  in  1987.  As  reflected  in 
DIAGRAM  5,  it rose  from  18.4  in  1960  to:  27.3%  in  1980 
to  decline  in  the  early  1980s  and  has  slightly 
oscillated since then. 
As  DIAGRAM  6  illustrates,  within  the  Community,  the 
major  markets  are  Germany  (30%  of  total  premiums  in 
1988),  the  UK  (25%)  and  France  (20%).  All  three  have 
relatively  large  populations  and  well  developed 
insurance  markets  for  both  life  and  non-lite.  Italy, 
with  also  a  large  population,  extensive  social 
security,  and  a  relatively  underdeveloped  insurance 
sector,  accounted  in  1988  for  only  8%  of all  premiums. 
The  Dutch  market,  with  very  high  levels  of  per  capi·ta 
insurance  business,  but  smaller  population  represented 
also  6%  of  premiums.  The  market  share ;of  the  remaining 
countries  ranged  from  5%  (Spain)  to  o.i%  (Luxembourg). 
Disaggregating  by  branch  one  notices  the  relative  low 
development  of  life  insurance  in  Italy  and  Portugal, 
and  the high  share of life  in~urance in the UK. 
(2)cf.  for  instance the econometric analysis of R. 
Teyssier  [1989]. 
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DIAGRAM  7  shows  the  distribution  of  insurance 
densities.  Japan  is the country  with the highest life 
insurance expenditure per head of population,  more  than 
twice that of the UK,  which  ranks top in the Community, 
closely followed  by  Germany.  The latters' level is also 
similar  to  that  in  the  us.  Ireland,  the  Netherlands, 
and  France  come ··next.  The  gap with Italy,  and  even more 
so,  Portugal  and  Greece  is  substantial.  In  non-life, 
the  u.s.  leads  and  Germany  is  the  first  Community 
country.  Denmark,  France,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
the  UK,  Belgium,  and  Japan  have  similar  levels,  with 
again  Portugal  and  Greece  showing the lowest levels. 
Although  conceptual  problems  underlie  the  measurement 
of  the  output  of  the  insurance  industry,  the  ratio  of 
gross  premiums  to  GDP  is commonly  used  as  an  indicator 
of  the  relative  development  of  the  insurance  business 
in  any  one  country.  As  DIAGRAM  8  shows,  Switzerland, 
and  Ireland  are  at  the  top  of  the  world  league.  The 
privately  run  social  security  system,  and  the  large 
share of  liability insurance provide  some  explanation. 
The  US,  UK  and  Japan  follow  suit.  Greece  is  the 
Community  country  with  the  least  developed  insurance 
sector,  accounting for only  1.24%  of GOP  in 1987. 
The  insurance  industry  is not  very  labour  intensive  so 
that,  as  displayed  in  DIAGRAM  9,  its  share  of  total 
employment  is less than,  or around  1%  in most  Community 
countries,  with the exceptions of Belgium and Portugal. 
Insurance  companies  are  instead  very  important 
financial  players both  in their home  markets  and  on the 
global  market.  DIAGRAM  10  displays  the  largest 
Community  companies  according  to  assets  and  a 
comparison  with  their  home  markets'  stock  exchange 
capitalisation.  The  relative  weight  of  the  top  Dutch 
companies,  as  well  as  that  of  Allianz  and  UAP,  are 
apparent. 
1.3.  Industrial organisation 
As  shown  in  DIAGRAMS  12  and  27,  both  Japanese  and  us 
top  insurance  companies  are  much  larger  than  their 
largest  Community  rivals  in  terms  of  assets.  Eight  of 
the  world  top  15  insurance  groups  in terms  of  premiums 
in 1988  were Japanese.  The  balance was  composed  of  6  US 
and  only  one  European,  Allianz,  ranking  seventh  in the 
list.  In Europe's  top  20  ranking Allianz was  first,  and 
the  only  German  representative,  far  ahead  of  UAP,  the 
second  Community  company  in  the  list.  But  as  a  group, 
the  largest  market  share  is  held  by  UK  companies 
(DIAGRAM  11). 8 
If the  market· share  of  the  top  5  comp.anies  is adopted 
as  a  measure  of  concentration,  then  non-life  insurance 
is more  fragmented  than  life assurance  in all markets, 
with the exception of the UK,  and there is considerable 
variation  across  Europe  in  the  degree  of  industry 
concentration,  as  is  also  in  the·  diversity  in  the 
number  of  companies  operating  in the  ma~ket,  displayed 
in  DIAGRAM  13,  which  shows  no  direct  relationship  to 
the  size  of  the  market.  This  is  most  apparent  when 
comparing the situations in the Community with those in 
Japan  and the u.s. 
DIAGRAM  14  shows  that  in  the  Community  (excluding 
Greece  and  Luxembourg)  Denmark  has  the  highest  degree 
of concentration  in life  (73%)  and  Portugal  in non-life 
(60%),  and  Germany  the  lowest  in  both  (34  and  25%, 
although  in  this  country  there  is  an  accounting  bias 
since  members  of  financial  groups  are  counted  as 
independent).  Outside  the  Community,  the  Scandinavian 
and  swiss  markets  are  heavily  concentrated  while  Japan 
shows  an  average  rate  (62  and  53%)  and  the  us  is  a 
typically fragmented  market  (20  and  26%). 
Market shares'  volatility can be taken as  a  signal of a 
competitive  environment.  They  may  also  be  an  indicator 
of  the  chances  for  a  new  entrant to  acquire  a  part of 
the  market.  In  an  empirical  analysis  of  three  markets 
(France,  Germany,  and  the  UK)  Finsinger(3)  concludes 
that  Germany,  which  has  the  most  highly  regulated 
insurance  market  has  a  low  market  share volatility.  In 
contrast,  the  relatively  unregulated  markets  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  increasingly  deregulated  French  market 
exhibit a  much  higher volatility. 
The  penetrability of national  insurance markets  through 
takeover  depends  also  on  the  legal  form  an4  ownership 
structure  of  firms  in  the  market.  Thus,  the  dominance 
of State- controlled,  and  mutual  companies  makes  entry 
into  the  French  market  difficult.  In  Germany,  in 
addition  to  a  relatively  small  number  of  large  and 
medium-sized  private  companies,small  mutual  compani,es 
also hold  a  significant market share. 
The  UK,  Belgian,  Spanish,  and  Dutch  markets  are 
dominated  by  domestic  private  sector  companies  (over 
75%)  with  mutuals  accounting  for  between  10  and  15%  of 
the  market.  In  Italy  mutuals  are  less  significant, 
while  the  State-owned  INA,  which  acts  as  compulsory 
reinsurer  of  a  set  proportion  of  all  life  contracts 
written,  commands  the  single  largest share  of the life 
market,  and controls  a  large quoted non-life company. 
(3)  cf.  Finsinger  (1990). 
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At  present,  there are  wide  differences  in  distribution 
systems  across  countries,  as  can  be  seen  from  DIAGRAM 
15.  Germany  is  the  country  where  tied  agents  hold  the 
largest  market  share.  Some  80%  of  all  personal 
insurance  in  that  country  is  channelled  through  tied 
advice.  Conversely,  corporate  business  is  originated 
mainly  via  independent  brokers.  On  the  other  extreme, 
in  the  United  Kingdom  and  in  the  Netherlands, 
distribution is mainly based on  independent brokers. 
These  differences  are  also  to  a  large  extent  a 
reflection  of  the  different  regulatory  systems.  In 
Luxembourg,  for  example,  independent  brokers  have  only 
recently  been  allowed  to  operate,  and  only  in  the 
corporate  business.  In  the  UK  the  structure  of 
distribution  for  life  products  changed  very  quickly 
following  the  UK  Financial  Services  Act  provision that 
intermediaries choose  to be  "tied" agents,  selling only 
the  products  of  a  single  company,  or  to  operate  as 
independent  brokers.  Those  who  choose  the  latter  are 
required to satisfy more .demanding criteria with regard 
to disclosure  and  the quality and cost of their advice. 
As  a  consequence,  the  number  of  previously  independent 
brokers halved,  and  the short-term business acquisition 
costs of the life companies  substantially raised. 
Measuring  productivity  in  insurance,  like  in  other 
services,  is  a  difficult  task  not  only  because  of  the 
difficulties  of  measuring  output  but  also  because 
available measures,  like  premiums  per  employee  or  even 
costs  ratios,  are very  much  influenced  by  price  levels 
andjor  regulatory  issues  usually  exogenous  to  firms. 
However,  if we  look  as  in  DXAGRAM  16  at  premiums  per 
total  employment  in  insurance  (both  production  and 
distribution)  then  Denmark,  Ireland,  The  Netherlands, 
and  Spain,  emerge  as  the  most  efficient  insurance 
industries,  well  ahead  of  the  US  and  Japan.  Belgium, 
Italy,  Portugal  and  Greece are those in need of greater 
productivity  improvements. 
Similar  problems  arise  when  trying  to  evaluate  and 
compare  profitability  within  and  between  countries 
because of differences in accounting,  reporting and tax 
and prudential  regimes. 
In  the  non-life sector,  as  captured by  DIAGRAM  17  the 
only  country  in  Europe  showing  a  modest  but consistent 
profitable  underwriting result over the period 1983-87 
has  been  Germany.  On  the other extreme,  in Scandinavian 
countries,  Spain  and  Belgium,  underwriting  was 
extremely  unprofitable,  although  offset  by  the  very 
high levels of  investment  income. 10 
Profitability  comparisons  of  life  insurance,  although 
made  even  more  difficult  by  the  variety  of  accounting 
practices,  yield  fluctuations  at least as  important  as 
for  the  non-life  business.  Member  States'  different 
statutory  rules  in  relation  to  the  allocation  of 
profits  between  shareholders  and  policyholders  account 
for  part  of  the  variation.  Thus  the  returns  to 
shareholders  from  life business  in Germany are very  low 
since  around  97%  of  surplus  goes  to  policyholders, 
whilst  those  in  The  Netherlands  {where  shareholders 
receive  most  of  capital  gains),  are  very  much  higher, 
as  are  those  in the  Italian  and  Spanish  life assurance 
markets.(DIAGRAM  18) 
Despite. the enactment  in all Member  States of the Fi1:-st 
Insurance  Directives  and  the  recent  wave  of  deals, 
cross-border  activity  of  insurance  companies  remains 
relatively low,  if we  measure the degree of penetration 
through  establishment  by  the  market  share  of  foreign 
firms  (defined  as  firms  majority-owned  by  foreigners) 
and  branches  of  foreign  companies.  It is  to  be  not:ed 
however  that  this  measure  underestimates  the  actual 
degree of penetration since it does  not  include  foreign 
minority stakes  in domestic  firms. 
Foreign penetration rates vary across countries,  as  can 
be  seen  from  DIAGRAM  19.  There  has  been little cross-
penetration  of  the  largest  markets,  whereas  in  the 
smaller  ones  penetration has  been  high.  Thus,  Portugal 
is  the  country  with  highest  penetration  (51%  in  life 
and  23%  in  non-life).  Greece,  Ireland  and  the 
Netherlands  have  rates  exceeding  20%  in  life,  and 
Ireland,  Spain,  and  again the Netherlands,  in non-life. 
As  could  be  expected,  cross-border  penetration 
originates  in  the  countries  with  most  developed 
insurance industries.  In the Community,  the originating 
countries of this foreign penetration are the  UK  (where 
business  written  abroad  through  branches  and 
subsidiaries represents  22%  of life and  31%  of non-life 
domestic  business),  Italy  (36%  and  34%)  and  the 
Netherlands  (33%  and  41%),  with  some  foreign  activity 
by  Belgian,  Danish  and  Irish companies,  and  negligible 
foreign  business  by  other  countries,  as  depicted  in 
DIAGRAM  20.  Outside  the  Community  Switzerland posts the 
highest  ratios  (53%  and  145%).  Note  that these  figures 
cover both cross-EEC,  and  non-EEC  penetration. 11 
Finally,  concerning cross-border provision of insurance 
services,  the  proportion  of  business  written  in  the 
country on  risks situated abroad  (both  EEC  and  non-EEC) 
to  total  business  is,  according  to  OECD  data, 
negligible except  for the  UK  and  Italy.  Thus  in  1988  UK 
insurers  made  30%  of  their  non-life  business  overseas 
and  Italian  insurers  wrote  6%  of  their life and  4%  of 
their  non-life  business  abroad.  Overall  some  8%  of 
premiums written in the Community  corresponded to risks 
situated  outside  the  country  of  establishment  of  the 
insurer. 
2.  MAIN  TRENDS 
2.1.  Growth  outlook 
As  DIAGRAM  21  illustrates,  the life business has  shown 
rates  between  ten  times  that  of  GOP  in  Spain  (due 
primarily to tax-driven shifts of savings assets),  five 
in Holland  and  below  two  in  both the  saturated markets 
(UK,  Ireland),  and the lower  income  countries  (Portugal 
and  Greece).  The  life  sector  has  grown  more  rapidly 
than  the  non-life  business  in  most  countries  (with 
Denmark,  Ireland  and the UK  as exceptions).  In the non-
life business,  the  growth  rates have  more  than  doubled 
those  of  GOP  in  the  more  developed  countries  of  the 
Community,  and  have  lagged  behind  GOP  growth  rates  in 
Portugal  and Greece. 
The  ageing  of population  across  Europe  means  that the 
proportion  of  individuals  in  the  age  band  generating 
the  maximum  premium  flows  into  the  insurance  industry 
will  increase  steadily  over  the  next  ten  years, 
especially  in  Italy,  Spain  and  Portugal,  as  shown  in 
DIAGRAM  22. 
Practitioners'  views,  as  reflected  by  the  Geneva-
Cologne  survey,  broadly confirm the above  forecast,  and 
place  Spain  as  the  market  with  highest  growth 
expectations,  followed  by  the  other  Mediterranean 
countries,  the  UK,  and  Germany.  Not  surprisingly,  the 
markets  with  lower  expected  growth  are  those  with 
highest  insurance  per  capita,  i.e.  the  Bene!  ux 
countries,  Denmark,  Switzerland and  Ireland. 12 
2.2.  Market  integration 
a)  pemand  factors 
The  heterogeneity  in  demand  and  in  the  underlying 
factors  put  limits  to  the  possibilities  of 
standardisation  of  strategies  and  products,  and  hence 
to  the  integration  of  the  insurance  market.  Moreover 
the  average  individual  customer  has  shown  little 
sophistication  and  a  rather  passive  attitude  in  it:s 
insurance  behaviour  so  that  insurance  sales  have  been 
originated  by  local,  active,  sales  forces.  The 
exception  to  this  profile  is  the  relatively  small 
community  of  expatriate,  high  income  individuals, 
showing  also  a  higher  affinity  in  their  preferences, 
and  more  able  to  circumvent  the  constraints  of  their 
national  markets  and  to  shop  around  for  the  best 
package. 
There  is  another,  larger,  sector  of  demand  that  sho\oirs 
homogeneity.  The  medium  to  large  corporate  customer, 
especially as it expands  abroad or increases exports to 
reap  the  advantages  from  the  more  homogeneous  internal 
market  in  industrial  products,  requires  relatively 
standard cover  instruments  and  has  been  pushing  for  a.n 
integrated insurance market. 
On  the  other hand  the  internal  market will  bring  about 
consolidation  in  the  industrial  and  commercial  sector·. 
As  corporate  customers  grow  in  size,  their  financia.l 
capacity  will  enable  them  to  retain  more  risk  and  be 
less  dependent  on  conventional  insurance  than  the:y 
presently  are.  More  large  corporations  and 
professional  associations will  also  opt  for  setting  up 
insurance captives. 
Hence  the  characteristics  of  demand  tend  to  shape  an 
insurance  single  market  that  will  consist  of  two 
differentiated  markets.  A  truly  integrated  market  for 
industrial  risks,  and  a  constellation  of  "regional 
markets11  catering  for  different  classes  of  consumers 
and  domestic-oriented  SMEs  and  responding  to different 
national  regulations. 
This  perspective  may  change  however  from  the  fact  that 
life  assurance  products  increasingly  incorporate 
savings  elements  (see  below)  and  compete  with  unit 
trust  products,  for  which  an  international  demand 
exists,  and  also  as  a  consequence  of  the  expansion  of 
international  insurance  brokers  that  will  offer  SHEs 
access  to  an  expanded  range  of  insurance  products  and 
suppliers. 13 
b)  Supply-side considerations 
Turning  to  the  supply  side,  insurers'  decisions  to 
expand  abroad  may  be  determined  by  several  objectives. 
First it may  prove  necessary  to  keep  customers  turned 
multinational.  It may  also respond to the relative high 
potential  or  profitability  of  the  target  market.  Or 
else,  it may  be  another  expression  of  the  search  for 
size,  discussed  in  the  next  section,  and  which  was 
cited  in  the  first  place  by  the  majority  of  senior 
executives  of  European  insurance  companies  responding 
to the Cologne-Geneva  survey. 
Establishing  a  cross-border  network  may  also  bring 
advantages  in  itself.  Networking  may  help  insurers 
improve  information  and  test  new  products  and 
techniques.  It  may  also  help  secure  a  better 
diversification of the risk portfolio.  Against that are 
the  facts  that  the  diversity  of  national  regulations 
and  characteristics  significantly  raises  the  costs  of 
networking  and  that  loss  and  premium  trends  are 
perceived  to  be  positively  correlated  in  Community 
countries,  thus  diminishing  the  diversification 
motivation. 
It  is  therefore  not  surprising  then  that  the  Bank  of 
England  survey  showed  that  hardly  any  firms  were 
looking  to  develop  a  single  strategy  across  Europe; 
given  the  continuing  regulatory,  fiscal  and  cultural 
disparities,  and  differing  levels  of  sophistication 
across  markets.  Although  most  British  insurers  were 
anxious  to  see  the  free  provision  of  insurance  across 
borders  enacted,  they  thought  that  presence  in  the 
target markets  was  necessary to market their products. 
Nor  is  it surprising  that  Spain,  with  low  insurance 
saturation,  high  growth potential,  high profitability, 
and  relative  openness,  is,  according  to  the  Geneva-
Cologne  survey  the  most  attractive  Community  market, 
followed  by  Italy,  France,  Germany  and  Great  Britain. 
The  survey  also  shows  that  foreign  penetration  is 
likely  to  be  highest  in  centrally  located,  hitherto 
relatively  protected,  major  markets,  like  France  and 
Germany,  in  highly  profitable,  high  growth,  ones  like 
Spain  and  Italy,  and  in the UK  (DIAGRAM  23). 
The  cross-border  activity  is  expected  to  originate  in 
highly  developed  markets  (Switzerland,  Great  Britain, 
Germany,  France,  Italy).  Those  less likely to originate 
cross-border  moves  are  Belgium,  and  the  outlying 
Portugal,  Ireland and  Greece  (DIAGRAM  24). 14 
Interestingly  enough,  Japan  is  not  seen 'as  a  serious; 
threat  in  this  survey  though  the  one  reported  by  the 
Bank  of  England  does  show  more  concern  from  British 
insurers  on  the  possibility  of  takeover  bids  coming 
from  Japan  and  the  US. 
Available  (even  if  partial)  evidence  of  M&A  ·activlty 
(measured  by  the  number  of  deals)  in  the  Communit:y, 
shown  in  DIAGRAM  25,  largely  confirms  the  above 
expectations.  Insurance  companies  in  the  growing 
Southern  markets  (Italy,  and  Spain)  have  been  the  main 
targets.  The  large  French  market  has  also  experienced 
substantial  intra-Community  activity,  with  the  u:K, 
Belgium,  and  the Netherlands  following suit.  The  UK  has 
remained  the  most  attractive  for  non-communi·ty 
investors,  with  Italy,  and  Spain  following  .in 
importance. 
The  acquiring  companies,  tend  to  be  from  neighbouring 
countries,  and  primarily .from centrally-located France, 
and  to  a  lower  extent  from  Italy  and  Germany,  as 
DIAGRAM  26  illustrates.  This  tends  to  confirm  the 
hypothesis that the first move  will be the  formation  f:.>f 
11regional 11  cross-border markets with either historical, 
commercial,  or linguistic links,  and that few  companies 
are aiming  for  a  pan-European market.  Again  in terms  t::>f 
numbers  British  firms  do  not  seem  to  have  shared  the 
frenzy  for  cross-border  deals  shown  by  their 
Continental  competitors.  As  expected,  swiss  firms  have 
been  the  most  interested  non-Community  acquirers  (and 
Italy and  Spain their preferred targets), with u.s.  and 
Australia ranking next and  aiming at UK  firms. 
2.3.  concentration  and  rationalisation 
As  represented  in  DIAGRAM  27,  empirical  evidence 
indicates  that  the  larger  the  market  the  larger  the 
averaqe  size of its top  insurers,  both  in the life and 
the non-life areas. 
This  can  lead one to infer that with the accomplishment 
of  the  Single  Market  in  insurance  the  average  company 
size  will  increase  (although  other·  factors,  e.g. 
cultural  and  linguistic barriers  may  hold this  process 
back).  On  the  other  hand,  it is  also  argued  that  the 
bigger  the  absolute  size  of  the  market  the  more 
economically  viable  individual  participants  it  can 
support  so  that  a  large,  highly  fragmented,  market  cun 
persist without  necessarily pointing to  th~ probability 
of  future  rationalisation.  Japan  vith  only  100 
companies  and  the  US  with  over  6000  are  examples  of 
these polar situations.  · 
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A  number  of  econometric  studies  have  addressed  the 
issue  of  the  relationship  between  output  and  operating 
costs  in  various  countries  and  for  different 
branches ( 4) .  The  results  are  not  conclusive,  but  a 
majority  of  them  seem  to confirm  the existence  of  weak 
economies  of  scale,  with  clearer evidence  in  the  life-
than  in  the  non-life  sector(5).  Mutual  companies  also 
seem  to  enjoy  clearer  economies  of  scale  than  stock 
companies.  The  form  of  the  company  also  seems  to 
influence the result(6). 
The  case of Spain depicted  in DIAGRAM  28  also  seems  to 
confirm  the  existence  of  scale  economies.  It shows  how 
cost  ratios  are  significantly  higher  for  smaller 
companies  than  for  medium-sized  ones,  and  that  the 
segment  of  relatively  larger  firms  enjoy  lower  cost 
ratios.  With  increased  competition  and  pressures  on 
margins,  few  of  the  small  companies  are  likely  to 
remain  independent. 
Some  analysts  point  out  that  scale  economies  can  be 
traced  to  specific  functions  or  cost  centers,  like 
computer,  communications  systems,  regulation 
compliance,  claims  volatility  management  (especially 
for  non-life),  distribution  networks,  investment 
income,  and brand  image  and reputation. 
However,  there  seem  to  be  upper  thresholds to the  size 
advantages.  The  bound  is  evaluated  at  about  ecu  2 
billion  of  premiums(?),  beyond  which  economies  would 
tend  to disappear.  Since  only  a  few  European  insurance 
companies  in  Germany,  the  UK,  France,  and  Switzerland 
exceed  that  threshold  significant  economies  of  may 
result  from  the  ongoing  domestic  consolidation process 
reflected  in  DIAGRAM  29.  The  relative  importance  of 
M&A  activity  in  the  period  1987-90  (the  most  active 
period  in  this  respect)  seems  to  indicate  that  in  the 
period  1987-90  the  consolidation  wave  has  been 
particularly  important  in  Italy,  and  France.  The  more 
reliable  evidence  on  the  evolution  of  the  number  of 
insurance companies  between  1983  and  1988  points to the 
importance  of  the  consolidation  process  in  Germany, 
Belgium,  Spain,  Denmark  and,  to a  lesser extent,  France 
and  the Netherlands. 
(4)  cf.  Pestieau and  Pirard  (1989). 
(5)  except  for  a  recent study by  Lahaye,  Perelman,  and 
Pestieau  [1989],  that concludes that in France the 
opposite prevails. 
(6)  cf.  Joskow;  Halpern  & Mathewson;  Lahaye,  Perelman 
and Pestieau  [1989]. 
(7)  cf.  McKinsey  (1989]. 16 
The  consolidation  process  has  run  in  parallel  with  ;an 
efficiency  improvement  in  European  insurance 
companies,  as  displayed in DIAGRAM  30,  where the rap.id 
progress  made  in  Spain  and  Luxembourg  (even  after the 
accounting  discrepancies  are  taken  into  account), 
France,  Denmark,  and the Netherlands,  contrast with the 
slow  increases  in Greece  and  Ireland.  DIAGRAM  31  shows 
that  this  progress  has  not  been  the  consequence  4':lf 
declines  in employment  (except  for slight reductions ln 
French  companies  and  in  Dutch  intermediaries,  and 
taking into account the accounting changes  in Spain and 
Luxembourg) .  Rather  on  the  contrary,  employment  has 
considerably  increased  in  Spain  (and  twice  as  much  :in 
Japan).  In Greece,  it is one  factor explaining the poor 
record  in productivity growth. 
2.4.  oespecialization.  respecialization.  and  t~ 
economies  of scope 
Traditionally,  the  boundaries  of  the activities  of the 
different  financial  sectors  were  relatively  well 
defined  and  protected  from  competition  ~hrough cartels 
(although  overlapping  existed  in  some  areas,  like  the 
one  covered  by  insurers'  surety  bonds  and 
bankers'financial  guarantees).  Cross-subsidization  of 
activities within  an  institution was  the  rule,  and  the 
marketing  strategies  of  financial  institutions did  not 
differenciate  much  amongst  consumer  segments. 
Consumers,  on their side were unsophisticated. 
Deregulation  has  brought  about  the possibility  for  new 
entrants,  and  consumers  have  found  it worthwile to shc>p 
around  for the best product. 
A major  consequence has been the process of blurring C)f 
the  traditional  frontiers  between  insurance,  banking, 
and other financial  services,  both in terms of products 
supplied  and  of  legal  organisation,  so  that  now  the 
choice  of  customer  (personal  vs  corporate)  and  the 
range  of  products  are  important  issues  in  an  insurer''  s 
strategic choices. 
a)  Product convergence 
All  financial  sectors  have  perceived  the  need  to 
compete  for  profitable market  segments  by  creating  and 
clustering  products  to  meet  certain  segments  c•f 
customers,  or  needs  at  specific  occasions  (e.g. 
financing  and  protecting  durable  goods,  real  estate, 
physical  protection  (health,  accident,  life),  income 
protection,  and  retirement  plans,  and  high-service  and 
assistance  products  suiting  the  needs  of  high  income 
individuals). 17 
This  process  has  been  clearer  in  the  personal 
insurance;savings  market.  In  the  non-life  insurance, 
banks  have  been  more  reluctant  because  the  techniques 
are  usually  very  different  from  banking  ones,  and  are 
apprehensive that their image  and  customer fidelity may 
be  hurt  by  customers  unsatisfied  with  some  claim 
settlement.  Notwithstanding,  some  products  combining 
non-life  insurance  and  savings  have  been  created  and 
some  banks  have  successfully  distributed  non-life 
insurance. 
Two  major  factors  have  contributed  to  this  process. 
Firstly,  an  increase  in  demand  for  endowment  products 
mainly  as  a  consequence  of the crisis in pay-as-you-go 
social  security  systems,  of  increased  personal  wealth, 
and  of  the  advantageous  tax  treatment  granted  to  life 
assurance. 
Secondly,  the  development  of global  securities markets 
and  the  improvements  in  information  and  computing 
capabilities  which  have  made  it  possible  to  design 
flexible,  high-yield,  mixed  insurance-savings 
products. 
In  most  countries  the  first  move  into  the  other 
sector's  territory  has  come  from  bankers  trying  to 
secure  their  customer  base  by  increasing  the  product 
range with pure life and  endowment  insurance. 
Insurers'  reaction  has  been  to  upgrade  and  dissociate 
the  savings  component  of  their  life  policies,  to 
introduce  flexibility  in  premiums  (variable  premium 
profile,  single  premium),  terms,  and  indemnities 
(variable  indemnity,  linked  to  a  choice  of  portfolio 
strategies),  and  to  add  credit  facilities,  plastic 
cards to the policies. 
b)  Structural aspects 
There  have  also been structural problems  in each of the 
sectors pushing  for convergence. 
Firstly,  changes  in  the  customer  base  have  led  both 
sectors to aim at the same  segments. 18 
In  the  banking  sector,  sharp  declines  in their  market 
share of  household's  savings,  and  higher  cost  thereof, 
as  a  consequence  of  lower  savings  rates,  saturation of 
potential  networks,  and  competition  with  money  market 
instruments.  This  has  been  coupled  with  decreased 
activity  with  the  corporate  sector  due  to 
securitisation  and  with  stricter  capitalisation 
requirements  which  have  also  put  limits  to  the  VQlume 
and  profitability  of  their  lending  activity,  and  led 
them to  aim at fee-income activities,  and in particular 
at  the  expanding,  profitable,  retail  insurance 
business. 
In  the  insurance  sector,  the  incentive  has  been 
competition  from  the  higher  yield  mutual  funds, 
especially in times  of inflation and  booming securities 
markets.  Insurers  have  also  seen  their  corporate 
business  suffer  from  disintermediation,  insofar  as. 
larger  firms  tend  to  increase their risk retention and 
to  create  captives,  thu~ also  worsening  the  insurers' 
risk portfolio. 
Moreover,  both  sectors  have  seen  advantages  in 
structural  linkages.  Capital  adequacy  rules  have  led 
banks  to  look  to  capital-rich  insurance  companies, 
while  insurers,  as they pay  increasing  ~ttention to the 
asset  side  of  the  balance  sheet,  have  pondered  if it 
would  not  be  appropriate  to  entrust  their  portfolio 
management  activities  to  captive  banks.  Another  source 
of  attraction  has  been  the  banking  sector's  higher 
level  of  expertise  on  international  markets.  For 
insurance companies,  linkages can provide them with the 
international expertise they may  need. 
Some  analysts  also point to the  fact that  insurers  can 
gain  from  convergence  insofar  as  banks  enjoy  a  better 
brand  image  than  themselves,  while  on  the  other  hand, 
investors  seem to value higher insurance companies  than 
banks  of similar capitalization. 
Both  parties  can  furthermore  benefit  from  economies  ~of 
scale  in  asset  management,  foreign  exchange, 
information  systems,  customer  account  monitoring,  and 
improved  access  to  major  deals.  Cross-sector deals  can 
thus  be  a  substitute for within-sector expansion. 19 
Moreover,  convergence  opens  up  possibilities  for 
product  innovation.  Banks  have  traditionally  avoided 
exposure  to  credit  risks  by  restricting  loans  to 
solvable  applicants  or  requiring collateral,  while  the 
insurance business is used to accept,  assess,  and price 
risks.  By  building on the risk management  techniques of 
insurance  companies  banks  may  be  able  to  offer  their 
customers  a  complete range of financial  products.  Banks 
also have  a  great deal of customer  information that may 
enable  insurers  to  screen  between  high-risk  and  low-
risk  customers,  and  thus  tailor  new  policies  for 
specific groups  and exploit profitable niches. 
c)  Distribution 
Thirdly,  and  probably  most  important,  as  referred  to 
above,  distribution  has  pushed  for  convergence.  In 
France,  while  distribution  costs  for  firms  using 
traditional  distribution  channels  account  for  21%  of 
premiums,  they  are  of  only  7%  for  banks.  Moreover, 
there  has  been  convergence  from  both  sectors  in  their 
change  from  product-based  marketing  to  customer-based 
marketing,  resulting  in the search  for the distribution 
channel  (or  combinati9n  of  channels)  most  likely  to 
improve  the hit-rates for the target customer segment. 
Consolidation is also leading towards  a  dissociation of 
the  production  and  distribution  functions.  An  insurer 
may  exploit  a  comparative  advantage  in say underwriting 
and  sell  its  branch  network  at  a  high  price  to  a 
foreign  company  or to a  bank eager to enter the market, 
or  earn  commission  income  by  distributing  banking  or 
other  insurers'  products.  And,  conversely,  banks  may 
try  to  mop  up  the  excess  capacity  in  their  branch 
network  and  increase  revenue  at  little  extra  cost  by 
selling insurance products produced  by  an  insurer. 
These  advantages  are  offset,  according  to  several 
analysts,  by  the  fact  that  structural  linkages  are 
made  difficult  by  the  traditionally  different  company 
cultures  of  the  two  sectors,  the  costs  of  training 
banks'  staff to sell insurance products,  the complexity 
of  these  latter  products,  and,  as  far  as  non-life 
insurance is concerned,  the danger of banks'  good  image 
been  tarnished  by  controversial  claim  adjustments,  and 
the  problem  of motivating  staff selling  insurance  on  a 
fixed salary basis,  while agents earn commissions. 
Increased  competition  both  from  conventional  insurers 
and  mutuals  and  shrinking  margins  leads  companies  to 
try and  cut distribution expenses,  which  are the second 
largest cost  component  for  insurance  companies,  behind 
claims.  As  DIAGRAM  32  shows  alternative  distribution 
channels may  result in substantial savings. 20 
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Traditional  insurance  distribution  ':  channel~~~  .. 
(especially,  exclusive  agents)  are  therefore  losing 
market  share  to  direct  marketing  techniques  in  price-
sensitive,  simpler products  (motor,  household).  Mutuals 
sell  in  France  over  one  half  of  motor  insurance.  In 
Sweden  one  half of household  insurance is sold over the 
telephone.  Car-dealers,  retail  stores,  real-estate 
agents,  and  banks,  either  in  cooperation  or  in 
competition with  insurers,  are successfully moving  into 
insurance  distribution.  Electronic  vendors  are  also 
likely to gain ground for simple,  standard products,  as 
insurers  heavy  investment  in  automation  is  now  turning 
from  the back offices to distribution. 
But,  rather  than  relying  on  a  single  channel,  more 
insurers  are  using  a  combination  of  them  to  target 
different segments  of customers,  or to benefit  from  the 
channels'  complementarities.  Nevertheless  the 
distribution  restructuring  is  not  happening  without 
tensions  as  agents  in  some  countries  actively  oppose 
companies  establishing  distribution  agreements  with 
banks  or other entities. 
The  choice  of  channel  is  also  sometimes  determined  by 
the  initial  size  or  financial  capacity._For  firms  not 
having  a  sufficiently  dense  network  the  alternatives 
are to acquire  one  from  a  company  in distress,  to enter 
a  cross-sector  distribution  agreement  or  to  base  i·ts 
distribution on direct marketing techniques. 
2.5.  Company  strategies 
As  discussed  earlier,  insurance  companies  are  faced 
with  the  choice  of  a  strategy  that  includes  at  least 
three major  issues:  the main type of customer  (personal 
vs  corporate),  the  market  (domestic  vs  international), 
and  the  range  of  products  (specialized  v.s  general). 
Then  they will  have  to clarify the target geographical 
scope  of  their  activity  and,  if  applicable,  the 
organizational vehicle. 
The  choice  of  type  of  customer  will ·be  determined  by 
the  size  of  the  retail  network  and  the  financial 
capacity of the  firm,  and  of  course,  of its expertise. 
As  discussed  earlier,  the  retail  business  is  expected 
to  remain  local  still  for  some  time.  The  corporate 
business  will  increasingly  require  cross-border 
networks,  although  of  a  much  lighter  nature,  and  a 
certain  size  to  cope  with  the  increasingly  volatile 
pattern of  claims~ 
...  ~- . 
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According  to  D.  Farny(B)  the  expected  pattern  of 
strategies is the one depicted in  DIAGRAM  33. 
It  shows  th.ree  types  of  winning  profiles.  A  few  large 
composite  1nsurance  companies  developing  world-wide 
operations  will  acquire  substantial  market  shares.  In 
compos! te  insurance,  these  global  companies  will 
coexist  with  a  number  of  "regional"  ones.  The  retail 
business  will  be  the  choice  of  ·the  largest  numbe~  of 
insurers,  and  there  the  national  scope  will  be 
predominant,  especially  for  specific  market  segments, 
although  some  companies  will  expand  into  neighbouring 
countries. 
A  second  class  consisting  of  specialists  in  general 
corporate  insurance  and  operating  cross-border  will 
retain  their  market  shares.  Some  corporate  non-life 
specialists will  also be  able to position themselves  in 
national  segments.  In  the  retail  business  some 
11regional 11  generalists  will  keep  their  share.  The 
remaining  types,  according  to  Farny,  are  expected  to 
lose ground. 
Most  sources  agree  that  there  is  no  single  optimal 
strategy  and  that  the  suitability of  one  or  the  other 
depends primarily  on  the characteristics of the company 
and  the  specific  market.  This  is  why  observed 
strategies  follow  very  diverse  patterns.  However  some 
stylized  facts  emerge  from  analysts'  opinions  and  the 
market evidence. 
In  cross-border  expansion  few  takeovers  of  large  firms 
can  be  expected,  given  the  financial  requirements  and 
the  political  implications  of  these  deals.  Mergers 
between  large  firms  are also considered problematic due 
to company,  and  national culture differences.  Financial 
and  culture  considerations  will  discourage  most 
companies  from  embarking  in  cross-border  greenfield 
retail activities,  while analysts  foresee  more  frequent 
acquisitions  of  small  and  medium-sized  operators,  by 
both  large  and  also  medium-sized  banks  and  insurance 
companies,  and  joint ventures. 
The  variety  of  strategic  options,  although  sometimes 
constrained  by  national  legislations,  is also  apparent 
in  the  choice  of  cross-sector moves,  where,  as  DIAGRAM 
34  shows,  actual  examples  exist  of  Community  firms 
having adopted all kinds  of strategies. 
(B)  Farny,  D.  (1990]: 22 
3.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
Although,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Single  Market  i~s 
perceived  to  open  up  the  possibility  of  securing 
important efficiency gains,  this optimism must not hide 
the  existence  of  some  areas  where  particular attention 
must  be  paid  to  ensure  that  its  benefits  are  fully 
reaped. 
Indeed,  the ultimate objective  of the  single market  is 
to  ensure  that  it  results  in  a  more  competitive 
situation  so  that  the  consumer  shares  in  the  benefits 
from it not only through wider choice but through  lowe:r 
prices.  Both  the  Cecchini  ( 9) report  and  the  Cologne 
survey  foresee that the single market  in insurance will 
bring  about  price  competition  and  reductions  iln 
premiums. 
But  several  factors  may  hinder  the  increase  in 
competition  and  preserve  oligopolistic  practices,  thus 
preventing  consumers  from  reaping  the  full  benefi·t 
potential  from  the  single  market.  If  scale  economie:s 
are  relatively  unimportant  in  financial  services,  and. 
if,  especially  in  the  retail  sector,  markets  will 
remain national,  then special attention must  be paid  t~o 
the present process of concentration in the industry so 
as to prevent competition distortions. 
The  wave  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  has  also resulted 
in very high prices being paid for target institutions, 
which  some  analysts  believe  were  exaggerated.  Given 
that more  often than not this kind of transaction fails 
to  generate  the  expected  profits,  these  costly 
acquisitions  weaken  the  capital  base  and  th~e 
profitability of the  acquiring  companies,  and  can  be  ,a 
factor of  distress in the industry. 
Another  source  of  instability  may  be  the  significan·t 
underwriting  losses  of  non-life  insurers,  only 
compensated  by  their  substantial  investment  income.  .A 
deterioration  of  the  overall  economic  situation  may 
reduce  financial  yields  and  again  cause  concern  to  the 
supervisory authorities.  Although  to  a  lesser extent, 
some  analysts  point  out  to  the  fact  that  increased 
competition  has  led life insurers  in  some  countries  to 
put  products  on  the  market  guaranteeing  interest rates 
that  may  be  difficult  to  sustain  if  the  situation 
deteriorates. 
(9)  CEC  (1988) 23 
The  convergence  between  banking  and  insurance  raises 
some  issues.  First,  if  both  sectors  target  the  same 
market  with  substitutable  products,  the  problems  of 
excess  capacity,  cut-throat  competition,  and  fine 
margins  may  lead  to  increased  risk  of  insolvencies  in 
financial  services.  Regarding  consumer  protection,  the 
creation  of  cross-sector  conglomerates  will  increase 
the  power  of  financial  actors  vis-a-vis  customers.  It 
may  also  lead  to  the  creation  of  captive  markets  via 
compulsory  packaging  of  products  (e.g.  mortgage  \·rith 
life assurance)  that may  also distort competition. 
And  in  most  countries  the  two  sectors  are  presently 
supervised  by  different  regulatory  bodies,  as  a 
consequence of the different characteristics of the two 
sector's  core  businesses.  However,  the  uncertainty  as 
to  the  supervisory  regime  applicable  to  hybrid 
products,  the  contagion  risk,  the  easier  asset  and 
liability transfer between  members  of  a  group,  and  the 
potential  conflicts  of  interest  point  to  the  need  for 
some  form  of consolidated supervision. 
Finally,  taxation  is  also  to  remain  for  some  time  an 
obstacle  to  the  full  realisation  of  a  competitive 
Single  insurance  market.  Besides  the  variety  of  tax 
rates  applicable  to  insurance  products,  that  will 
require  a  special  effort  by  tax  authorities  to  avoid 
tax  evasion  and  distortion  of  trade  in  insurance,  tax 
codes  are  also  far  from  uniform  concerning  the  income 
tax  reliefs  of  payments  to  policyholders,  and  of  life 
assurance  premiums.  And  the  taxation  of  insurance 
companies,  as  relates  reserves  and  investment  gains 
will  also  clearly  affect  the  competitive  edge  of 
insurance  companies  in different Member  States. .  ~·  1  .  ~  -·:·  ' 
:·  _, 
,,,  ,  .. 
·,, 
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SOME  APPROACHES  TO  CROSS-BORDER  EXPANSION 
BY  COMMUNITY  BANKS  AND  INSURANCE  COMPANIES 
Joint production: 
CGER  (B) 
Merger: 
Unibank  Danmark-Nykredit-Trygg  (DK) 
Acquisition: 
A&M:  BfG  (D) 
Royale  Belge:  Ipsa  (B) 
Groupe  AG:  Metropolitan  Bank,  Banque Tirlemontoise  (B) 
BBV:  Euroseguros  (E) 
UAP:  Worms 
AEGON:  Friesch-Groningsche Hypothekenbank  (NL) 
Rabobank:  Interpolis  (NL) 
Mapfre:  Invherbank  (E) 
Majority stake: 
BBV:  Aurora  Polar,  Plus Ultra,  DAPA  (E). 
Banco  Central:  B.  Vitalicio,  Nac.Hispanica, 
Vasco  Navarra  (E 
Banesto:  Uni6n  y  el Fenix  (E) 
B.  Hispano  Americana:  La  Estrella  (E) 
GAN:  CIC,  BIF  (F) 
AGF:  Banque  le Phenix  {F) 
MGF:  SOFINNAM  (F) 
Captives: 
Deutsche  Bank:  DB  Leben 
Baltica:  Baltica  Bank  (DK) 
Cajas  de  Ahorro:  Caser  (E) 
Banco  de  Santander:  Cenit  (E) 
Credit agricole:  Predica,  Pacifica  (F) 
AEGON:  AEGON  Hypothekenbank  (NL) 
Holding: 
Baltica  (OK) 
Unibank  Danmark-Nykredit-Trygg  {OK) 
Nationale Nederlanden-NMB-Postbank  (NL) 
Joint Venture: 
Commerzbank-DBV:  Commerzbank  & Partner  (D) 
Generale de  Banque  - AG:  Alpha  Life  (B) 
Banesto  - Union  y  el Fenix:  Banfenix  (E) credit agricola - Groupama  (F) 
GAN  - CIC  (F) 
TSB  - Scottish EquiCHART  (UK) 
Minority stake: 
Den  Danske  Bank-Hafnia-Kredit  foreningen  Denmark  (OK) 
BNP  - UAP  (F) 
Dresdner  - Allianz  (D) 
GAN  - societe Generale 
Nationale Nederlanden:  ABN,  Amrobank  (NL) 
AEGON  - Amrobank  (NL) 
Alliance without equity stake: 
Nederl.  Middenstandsbank  (NL)-Erste Allgemeine  (A) 
Distribution agreements: 
Abbey  Life  - Lloyds  (UK) 
Dresdner  Bank  - regional  insurance companies  (D) 
Kredietbank  - Fidelitas  (B) 
Banco  Comercial  Portugues  - Occidental  (P) 
Caixa  General  de  Depositos-Fidelidade-Banco Nacional 
Ultrarn. (P) 
Independent brokerage: 
National Westminster  (UK) Dla 
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DIAGRAM  10 
LARGEST  COMMUNITY  INSURANCE  COMPANIES  (BY  ASSETS) 
AND  HOME  STOCK  MARKET  CAPITALISATION 
% OF  HOME 
COMMUNITY  WORLD  NAT  ASSETS  STOCK  EXCH. 
RANKING  RANKING  COMPANY  (biO  e6u)  CAPITALIS. 
1  9  Prudential  Corp.  UK  47.2  8.0% 
2  15  Nationale-Nederlanden  NL  34.5  43.6% 
3  18  Allianz  Lebens  D  30.0  14.6% 
4  19  UAP  F  29.9  15.7% 
5  23  Norwich  Union  UK  25.1  4.3% 
6  27  Standard  Life  UK  23.3  4.0% 
7  31  Aegon  NL  21.3  26.9% 
8  32  Legal  & General  UK  21.1  3.6% 
9  34  Royal  Insurance  UK  20.9  3.6% 
10  35  Assicurazioni  Generali  I  20.8  18.0% 
11  38  Commercial  Union  UK  19.0  3.2% 
12  42  Sun Alliance  UK  18.6  3.2% 
13  47  AGF  F  16.1  8.5% 
14  49  Allianz  Group  D  15.8  7.7% DIAGRAM 11 
EUROPE,S LARGEST GROUPS 1988 (PREMIUMS) 
1 Allianz 
2  Zurich Group 
3  UAP 
4  Prudential Corp 
5  Generali 
6  Royal Insurance 
7  Nationale Nederlanden 
8  AXA 
9  Winthertur 
1  0  Sun Alliance 
11  AGF 
12 Commercial Union 
13 Genera! Accident 
14 Colonia 
15 Guardian Royal Exchange 
16 GAN 
17 RAS 
18 Skandia 
19 Legat and General 
20 Aegon 
Source: FFSA 
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DIAGRAM 12 
WORLD LARGEST INSURANCE GROUPS 
(by assets, 1988) 
NAT 
ION  ASSETS 
COMMUNil  WORLD  AU (mio ecu) 
RANKING  RANKING  COMPANY  TV 
1 Prudential  us  129406 
2  Nippon Life  J  122732 
3  Dai lchi Mutual Life  J  84282 
... 4 Metropolitan Life  us  79689 
·s  Sumitomo Life  J  70741 
6 Aetna  us  68850 
7 Equitable life  us  49072 
8  Cigna  us  47209 
1  9 Prudential Corp.  UK  47163 
10  Meiji Mutual Life  J  45975 
11  Travelers  us  45101 
12  Tokyo Marine&Fire  J  42222 
13  New York Life  us  40945 
14  Asahi Mutual Life  J  35381 
2  15  Nationale-Nederlanden  NL  34534 
16  Teachers Insurance  us  32711 
17  American International  us  31636 
3  18 Allianz lebens  0  30010 
4  19  Union des Assurances de Paris  F  29926 
20 Mitsui Mutual life  J  29597 
21  StateF  arm Mutual  us  26150 
22  American General  us  31636 
5  23  Norwich Union  UK  25123 
24  AU State  us  25123 
25  John Hancock  us  24914 
26  Yasuda Mutual Life  J  24825 
6  27  Standard Life  UK  23267 
28  Transamerica  us  22629 
29  Loewa  us  21844 
30  Northwestern Mutual  us  21448 
7  31  Aegon  NL  21333 
8  32 Legal & General  UK  21146 
33 Australian Mutual  AU~  20996 
9  34  Royal Insurance  UK  20885 
10  35 Assicurazioni Generali  I  20794 
36 Taisho Marine & Fire  J  19284 
37  Massachusetts Mutual  us  19187 
11  38  Commercial Union  UK  19014 
39  Principal Mutual Life  us  18984 
40  Nationwide Insurance  us  18900 
41  Winterthur Group  CH  18862 
12  42 Sun Alliance  UK  18647 
43 Swiss Life  CH  18623 
44  Lincoln National  us  1n29 
45 Manufacturers Life  cor  16937 
46 Sun Life  cor  16437 
13  ' 47  Assurances Generales de France  F  16114 
48 Swiss Reinsurance  CH  16093 
14  49  Allianz Group  D  15795 
50  First Executive  us  15412 
(*): Allianz Life+  Non Life 
SOURCE:  Wall Street Journal D
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 DI AGRAN  31 
Forecast  of  the  types  of  European  insurers  to  emerae 
---·----------- . -----,----------·-·---------·······  --·-·-·--.. ---· 
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C:onsiJcrahh.: anJ/or growing illlp~trt~lllC(.' of IlK·  fltlli.)\~·ing types of insurers; 
Type J a:  (very~ large gl.'nl.'ral imun:rs opa:ratiug worl;lwidc 
Type Ja:  general insurers operating nation:..~lly ami in sck:l'tcd countries 
Type ~J:  insurers operuling nationally in the pri\'alt~ custum(.:r sector 
Type -lc:  insurers operating na:i.•nally in sclc..·t·tcd  scgm~.~nts of the private customer 
scctor 
...... nwlkr:tll.' anJ/,\r conslanl imp••rLtrll"l.' 
!  lillk and/or dcrlining importaJH'l' 
SOURCE:  FARNY 
3R9 DIAGRAM  34 
SOME  APPROACHES  TO  CROSS-BORDER  EXPANSION 
BY  CO~~NITY BANKS  AND  INSURANCE  COMPANIES 
Joint production: 
CGER  (B) 
Merger: 
Unibank  Danmark-Nykredit-Tryqg  (DK) 
Acquisition: 
A&M:  BfG  (D) 
Royale  Belge:  Ipsa  (B) 
Groupe  AG;  Metropolitan  Bank,  Banque  Tirlemontoise  (B) 
BBV:  Euroseguros  (E) 
UAP:  Worms 
AEGON:  Friesch-Groningsche Hypothekenbank  (NL) 
Rabobank:  Interpolis  (NL) 
Mapfre:  Invherbank  (E) 
Majority stake: 
BBV:  Aurora Polar,  Plus Ultra,  DAPA  (E). 
Banco central:  B.  Vitalicio,  Nac.Hispanica, 
Vasco  Navarra  (E 
Banesto:  Uni6n  y  el Fenix  (E) 
B.  Hispano Americana:  La  Estrella  (E) 
GAN:  CIC,  BIF  (F) 
AGF:  Banque le Phenix  (F) 
MGF:  SOFINNAM  (F) 
Captives: 
Deutsche  Bank:  DB  Leben 
Baltica:  Baltica Bank  (DK) 
Cajas de  Ahorro:  Caser  (E) 
Banco  de Santander:  Cenit  (E) 
credit agricole:  Predica,  Pacifica  {F) 
AEGON:  AEGON  Hypothekenbank  (NL) 
Holding: 
Baltica  (OK) 
Unibank  Danmark-Nykredit-Trygg  (OK) 
Nationale Nederlanden-NMB-Postbank  (NL) 
Joint Venture: 
Commerzbank-DBV:  commerzbank  & Partner  (D) 
Generale de  Banque  - AG:  Alpha  Life  (B) 
Banesto  - Uni6n  y  el Fenix:  Banfenix  (E) credit· agrioole - Groupama  (F) 
GAN  - CIC  (F) 
TSB  - Scottish EquiCHART  (UK) 
Minority stake: 
Den  Danske Bank-Hafnia-Kredit foreningen  Denmark  (DK) 
BNP  - UAP  (F) 
Dresdner - Allianz  (D) 
GAN  - societe Generale 
Nationale Nederlanden:  ABN,  Amrobank  (NL) 
AEGON  - Amrobank  (NL) 
Alliance without equity stake: 
Nederl.  Middenstandsbank  (NL)-Erste Allgemeine  (A) 
Distribution agreements: 
Abbey  Life - Lloyds  (UK) 
Dresdner  Bank  - regional  insurance companies  (D) 
Kredietbank - Fidelitas  (B) 
Banco  Comercial  Portugues  - Occidental  (P) 
caixa General  de Depositos-Fidelidade-Banco Nacional 
Ultram.(P) 
Independent brokerage: 
National Westminster  (UK) 
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